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ABSTRACT
Previous research has suggested that an over-reliance on external self-relevant 
stimuli, which can lead to extreme fluctuations in feelings of self-esteem, is a risk factor 
for depression (Butler et al., 1994). It was hypothesized that uncertainty about self­
attributes offers an explanation as to why some individuals are overly susceptible to 
outside influences and, hence, more prone to depression. Study 1 indicated that both 
poorer esteem and less certainty about the self were associated with greater depression. 
Study 2 expanded on Study 1 by collecting longitudinal data and exploring emotional 
information as one possible source of external stimuli associated with self-esteem lability. 
As expected, uncertainty about the self and emotional sensitivity did explain a significant 
amount of variance in self-esteem fluctuations. When all variables were entered into a 
regression analysis, self-concept uncertainty was the only significant predictor of 
depression. Further study of self-esteem lability and self-concept uncertainty is advocated, 
and possible interventions for depression are discussed.
Self-Concept Uncertainty and Self-Esteem Lability 
Vulnerability Factors for Depression?
2INTRODUCTION
The research that has explored 'the self is rich and extensive and embodies a 
pursuit that has engaged psychologists almost since psychology began as a discipline. How 
individuals construct their sense of'self has been a matter of debate among various 
theorists and researchers, but all have recognized that this sense of self is essential to an 
individual's identity, and is considered to have two major components: self-concept (or 
self-image) and self-esteem. Both of these components are seen as essential to 
understanding how an individual views him or herself and the world. Self-concept has 
been described as the content aspect of self—a multifaceted, dynamic cognitive schema 
that represents and controls our knowledge of previous thoughts and deeds, essentially 
what we have been and done (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Examples of the knowledge 
components have included beliefs about one's specific attributes, including traits and 
physical appearance, as well as one's social roles, values, and goals (Campbell, Trapnell, 
Heine, Katz, Lavallee, & Lehman, 1996). Several researchers have defined the main 
function of the self-concept is to guide future ideas and actions, to structure what we will 
one day be or do (Campbell & Lavallee, 1993; Markus & Nurius, 1984).
Self-esteem, on the other hand, is delineated as the emotion-laden, evaluative 
component of one's self-view, described by Campbell and Lavallee (1993) as "a self­
reflexive attitude that is the product of viewing the self as an object of evaluation" (p. 4). 
Achieving consistency in the sense of self, understanding who you are and feeling good 
about yourself, is considered essential to achieving a healthy adult personality and 
experiencing positive adjustment throughout the lifespan (Erikson, 1950).
3Views of the Self and Risk for Depression
With the goal of exploring exactly how concepts of the self relate to adjustment, 
one aspect of the self, self-esteem, has been a topic of considerable focus. Self-esteem has 
spawned such a prolific body of literature perhaps because it has been shown to have 
pervasive and powerful influences on many areas of human existence, including cognition, 
emotion, mood, and behavior (Campbell & Lavallee, 1993). Previous research has 
indicated that a consistent positive view of oneself—high self-esteem—is generally related 
to psychological wellbeing (Baumeister, 1993; Cambell & Lavallee, 1993; Harter, 1993).
Perhaps even more important, research has suggested associations between self­
esteem (or self-evaluation) and depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Beck, 
Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Butler, Hokanson, & Flynn, 1994; Garber, Weiss, &
Shanley, 1993; Kuiper & Olinger, 1986). Although both research and clinical experience 
generally have implicated self-esteem- as having a causal role in the development of 
depressive symptomology, many investigations of the relationship between self-esteem and 
the on-set of depression have yielded inconsistent results (Altman & Wittenborn, 1980; 
Hamilton & Abramson, 1983; Hokanson, Rubert, Welker, Hollander, & Hedeen, 1989; 
Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, & Franklin, 1981). Recognizing these inconsistencies, 
Harter (1993) described the importance of delineating global self-esteem from self-esteem 
in specific domains, as well as the need to ascertain the importance of a specific domain 
for the individual. Pelham (1991) also found that a negative evaluation of the self does not 
lead to poor self-esteem or depression if the evaluative domain is not considered 
important. For instance, even if an individual believed herself to be athletically challenged, 
if sports are not an important aspect of her life, this would not influence her over-all 
feelings o f self-worth, nor would she become depressed by poor performance. In fact, 
Pelham (1993) found that even an individual who tends to have a globally poor (or
4neutral) view of himself might have one specific domain at which he feels very competent 
and confident. He argued that this one positive area could be enough to stall the 
development of depression. Other inconsistencies in the low self-esteem depression 
literature also included the finding that even when a depressed (or formerly depressed) 
individual's trait self-esteem is not especially low, the individual may still believe that self­
esteem comes from outside sources (Beck et al., 1979; Marzeiller, 1986).
These apparently contradictory findings suggest that the self-esteem-depression 
connection is much more complicated than simply saying low self-esteem leads to 
depression and have prompted some researchers to suggest that these inconsistencies have 
implications for the way in which self-esteem should be conceptualized as a risk factor for 
depression. Building on the finding that some individuals' self-esteem comes from external 
sources, Kernis (1993) proposed expanding past research that solely focused on self­
esteem as a trait to recognize the day-to-day fluctuations in feelings of self-worth that 
could result from the belief that self-esteem comes from outside sources, which he labels 
as 'self-esteem stability.' Self-esteem stability, or lability, is operationalized as a continuum 
on which individuals differ, with slight to moderate reactivity of feelings of self-worth to 
daily hassles and uplifts considered normal (Butler, Hokanson & Flynn, 1994; Kernis, 
Cornell, Sun, Berry, & Harlow, 1993; Kernis, 1993). High lability, excessive alternating 
highs and lows in self-esteem (Butler et al., 1994), however, may put an individual at 
higher risk for a major depressive episode because less life stress is required to precipitate 
an on-set of negative affect. Using lability as a construct, Butler and colleagues (1994) 
found self-esteem lability to be a better index of depression-proneness than simple 
measures of trait self-esteem. In fact, self-esteem lability at initial measurement was found 
to increase risk for depression at a second measurement five months later. Roberts and 
Monroe (1992) also found that greater lability in self-esteem predicted increases in
5depressive symptoms at later assessments.
In addition to recognizing the importance of self-esteem lability as an important 
construct, researchers (Kernis, Granneman & Mathis, 1991; Roberts, Kassel, & Gotlib, 
1995) have also begun to recognize an important point regarding the predictive nature of 
self-esteem lability. Specifically, Kernis et al. (1991) emphasize that it is important to note 
that individuals who have stable self-esteem tend to fluctuate less on a short-term basis in 
their current self-esteem. Therefore, for individuals with stable self-esteem, a measure of 
global self-esteem at any given time is likely to be highly indicative of their trait self­
esteem. A very different picture is presented by the labile individual, however. For these 
people, a measure of self-esteem at any one time may be very different from their general 
level of self-esteem. For instance, vulnerable individuals would not necessarily be 
characterized by low self-esteem at every assessment. In fact, in his research, Kernis 
(1993) advocated the importance of exploring the possible interaction of one's global level 
of self-esteem with one's general tendency to have either more labile or more stable self­
esteem from day to day. He described four basic self-esteem categories: Stable High, 
Unstable High, Unstable Low, and Stable Low. Based on these findings, both Kernis et al. 
(1991) and Roberts et al. (1995) have suggested that it is the interaction between global 
level and instability that may explain the inconsistent results in the low self-esteem- 
depression literature.
In order to test this idea, Kernis et al. (1991) conducted a study that examined 
both and of self-esteem and the stability of that level in predicting depression. Indeed, 
they found that instability of self-esteem appeared to serve as risk factor for depression by 
moderating the relationship between trait level of self-esteem and depression. Although 
Kernis has shown repeated empirical support for both level and instability of self-esteem 
predicting depressive symptomology (Kernis et al., 1993; Kernis et al., 1992), others have
6found inconsistencies.
In their investigations, Roberts et al. (1995) found that the interaction between 
level of self-esteem and instability of self-esteem failed to be a significant predictor of 
changes in depressive symptoms, contrary to Kernis et al (1991). Instead, they suggested 
that Kernis et al.’s (1991) finding is unreliable and offered evidence that level of self­
esteem was associated with future depresssive symptoms in both individuals with relatively 
stable and labile self-esteem.
Overall, however, many of these findings suggest that it is may not be low self­
esteem per se that is a risk factor for depression, but perhaps the enhanced sensitivity to 
evaluative events and over-reliance on social sources of information (Butler et al., 1994; 
Kernis, 1993; Roberts & Monroe, 1992). This over-reliance on and heightened sensitivity 
to external sources of evalutation can promote instability in self-esteem as a result of the 
often ambiguous and possibly contradictory nature of others' statements and sentiments 
(Butler, et al., 1994; Kernis, 1993).
With their findings, Butler et al. (1994) and Kernis (1993) offered support for the 
view that some individuals display greater fluctuations in state self-esteem due to a greater 
dependency on external life-events or social occurrences and are also more likely to 
endorse dysfunctional attitudes, such as the belief that one's self-worth depends greatly 
upon environmental occurrences and/or other's evaluations of one's actions. Yet, past 
research has offered few explicit explanations for why some individuals are more prone to 
these patterns of thinking, why some individuals are more sensitive to social self-relevant 
stimuli and may experience self-esteem lability. However, one possible explanation for 
differences in reactivity to external information and heightened sensitivity to perceived life 
stresses may exist: self-concept certainty.
7Self-concept clarity, or certainty (SCC), is operationalized as the extent to which 
the contents o f self-beliefs are clearly, consistently, and confidently defined (Campbell, 
1990; Campbell & Lavallee, 1993); it is a structural aspect of self-concept. It is 
independent of content and accuracy of one's beliefs (Campbell et al., 1996). SCC is 
considered to be narrower in focus than the larger construct of identity, which embodies a 
much richer and more complex set of elements than certainty (Campbell, 1990; Campbell 
& Lavallee, 1993; Campbell, Chew, & Scratchley, 1991; Campbell et al., 1996). In 
extensive investigations, Campbell and colleagues (1996) offered evidence that SCC 
differed among individuals and could be measured reliabily and validly. Baumgardner
(1990) found that this difference was not due to global uncertainty or a tendency for low 
self-esteem individuals to have a more conservative or protective presentation style.
Furthermore, Campbell (1990) also delineated the construct of self-concept 
uncertainty from functional flexibility, which others have defined as the individual's 
perceived capability to perform a wide range of social behaviors required by situations 
(Paulus & Martin, 1988). Although it is almost certain that some individuals have more 
flexible views of themselves than others, Campbell (1990) has argued that within this 
group there is a further subset of people whose self-concepts are also characterized by less 
confidence and stability. These individuals are more likely to report a feeling of 
situationality, or the subjective sensation that one's behavior is very strongly influenced, or 
controlled, by the environment. Perceived control in behavior fluctuation seems to be the 
defining factor. Situatonality is associated with a subjective feeling of being acted upon, 
while flexible functionality is related to a subjective feeling of being an actor or an agent.
Together, these investigations suggest that self-concept certainty is a personality 
trait that differentiates individuals. Individuals without self-concept certainty lack a 
consistent definition of their attributes, competencies, or abilities so that they have fewer
8definite views about what they are like or how they feel, and the views they do have 
contain contradictions, inconsistencies, and fluctuate from day to day (Baumeister, 1993). 
These individuals wander through life wondering, "Who am I? What do I want?" 
(Baumeister, 1993; Campbell et al., 1993). Baumgardner (1990) suggests that a strong 
sense of identity, or certainty in self-attributes, promotes a sense of understanding about, 
and confidence in, oneself. People who are certain they have a specific trait or ability, 
whether it is a positive or negative trait, can selectively choose situations to maximize 
outcomes, especially to gain self-affirming information. In this way, confidence that one 
possesses traits and attributes gives an individual a sense of control over various situations 
and the future (Baumgardner, 1990). These individuals generally know who they are, how 
they feel, what they want, and how to get it. This, in turn, should engender positive 
feelings about the self.
In fact, Campbell and colleagues (Campbell et al., 1993; Campbell et al., 1996), as 
well as Baumgardner (1990), have demonstrated a connection between self-concept clarity 
and global self-esteem. Several recent studies have found that low (or moderately low) 
self-esteem individuals are characterized by less clarity or certainty in their self-concepts 
(Baumeister, 1993). Low self-esteem participants tend to exhibit less extremity and self- 
reported confidence about possessing personality attributes (Baumgardner, 1990; 
Campbell, 1990). Individuals scoring low on self-esteem measures also display less 
stability in their self-concepts over time, less internal consistency in self-definitions, lower 
self-related confidence, and longer reaction times when making me/not me responses to 
pairs o f opposite traits (Campbell, 1990). Contrary to the suggestion that low-self esteem 
individuals display global uncertainty, Baumgardner (1990) found that low self-esteem 
individuals exhibited significantly broader confidence intervals and longer reaction times 
than high self-esteem individuals when rating their own traits but not when rating traits of
friends (Campbell & Lavallee, 1993); this suggests that lack of certainty is limited only to 
specific self-judgments. Low self-esteem individuals just seem to know less about 
themselves (Baumeister, 1993).
One purpose of the present study was to attempt to integrate previous research on 
self-concept uncertainty, self-esteem lability, and depression. Based on previous work, it 
was hypothesized that the construct of self-concept uncertainty offers a plausible and 
parsimonious explanation for why some individuals, especially low self-esteem individuals, 
demonstrate 'self-esteem plasticity' (Brockner, 1984), or lability, and why other individuals 
are not as prone to this instability. Those who lack clarity of self-concept should be more 
dependent on, susceptible to, and influenced by external perceived self-relevent stimuli, 
both negative and positive (Campbell, 1990), which is associated with self-esteem lability 
and negative affect (Butler et al., 1994). This view is consistent with theories of 
depression offered by both psychodynamic theories (e.g., Fenichel, 1945; Rado, 1928) and 
cognitive theories (Beck et al., 1979), which postulate that there are certain risk factors 
that can predispose an individual to depression once they are exposed to some stressor. It 
is also consistent with Erikson's (1950, 1959, 1968) theory of psychosocial development, 
which holds that a strong sense of identity is essential to a healthy adult personality and 
positive mental health across the lifespan.
Emotional Intelligence and Depression
The present study also explored how emotional sensitivity, or emotional 
intelligence, might become a risk factor for depression in individuals who have uncertain 
self-concepts. Salovey and Mayer define emotional intelligence as the subset of social 
intelligence that involves the ability to perceive, understand and monitor one's own and 
other's feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use this information to 
better predict others' future behavior and guide one's own thinking and actions (Goleman,
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1995; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Chief among these abilities is 
empathy, which Salovey and Mayer (1990) define as the capacity to recognize, 
comprehend, and re-experience another's emotions. These skills, they argued, are the 
cornerstone of a healthy personality and essential to well being. To the extent that one has 
these skills, one will be more successful in most aspects of life. In fact, Salovey and Mayer
(1990) advocated emotional intelligence as "necessary for a minimum level of competence 
and adequate functioning" (p. 201). Emotional intelligence is touted as a coherent 
construct that should be one of the more important factors in wellbeing across the lifespan.
In support of this theory, there is evidence that emotional recognition and empathy 
are valid constructs. Mehrabian, Young, and Sato (1988) offer clear evidence that some 
individuals are just more emotionally "in tune" than others. For instance, they reported 
findings that individuals rated as high in empathy were more emotionally arousable than 
non-empathic persons; these participants displayed greater skin conductance, higher heart 
rate responses, and greater tendencies to weep when exposed to emotional stimuli. Sullins
(1991) offered evidence that there can be an element of "mood transfer" between 
individuals, even after only a brief time spent together, so that the emotional tone of two 
partners become more alike. In fact, this can occur even if the partners do not speak to 
one another while interacting (Sullins, 1991). Goleman (1995) suggests that some people 
just appear more susceptible to emotional contagion. This trait tends to make these 
individuals more emotionally labile, because this sensitivity seems to facilitate the sending 
and receiving of moods, even if moods are negative.
Goleman (1995) argues, contrary to Salovey and Mayer (1990), that evidence for 
the relationship between emotional intelligence and wellbeing is not consistent. Although 
explorations of the relationship between emotional intelligence are in their infancy, at least 
one study did not find a significant relationship between emotional intelligence and life
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success. Feist and Barron (1996) found that "personal soundness," their operationalization 
of emotional intelligence, explained a considerable amount of the variance in career 
success over and above measures of academic intelligence, but that neither form of 
intelligence predicted life satisfaction. In interpreting this finding, the authors posit that 
being sensitive to one’s own and other's emotional states may not lead to greater happiness 
or more satisfaction in life. In fact, they suggest that knowing and managing emotions of 
self and others is a draining task considering the pain and suffering of the modern world. 
Therefore, individuals may become "wiser, but sadder."
Findings such as these suggest that the relationship between emotional intelligence 
and well being may not be strong in magnitude. In fact, as suggested by Feist and Barron 
(1996), the potential may exist for a connection between emotional intelligence and 
suboptimal adjustment, perhaps even depression. In order to understand how this might 
occur, it is important to recognize some very important assumptions in Mayer and 
Salovey's theory. In emphasizing how emotions can be used intelligently, Salovey and 
Mayer (1990) construct a very cognitive view of emotional sensitivity that indirectly 
involves a number of social skills, social perceptiveness, and, indeed, self-awareness. They 
emphasize emotional intelligence as "reasoning that takes emotions into account" (p. 2); 
"the ability to understand emotion and emotional knowledge...the ability to regulate 
emotions to promote emotional and intellectual growth" (p. 6). In contrast, Mehrabian, 
Young, and Sato (1988), view empathy as an individual's vicarious emotional response to 
perceived emotional experiences of others; this is seen as a more basic or "primitive" level 
o f process whereby, almost through a process of contagion, an individual responds with 
emotions similar to those present. Considering this line of research and reconciling it with 
Mayer and Salovey's position, it can be argued that the construct Mayer and Salovey label 
as emotional intelligence is actually two distinct, but related, abilities or processes: 1) the
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ability to recognize and understand emotions, and empathize with others—basically, being 
affected by emotional information, and 2) the ability to make use of this information 
'effectively'.
For some individuals, it is possible that they are sensitive to the emotional 
expressions and feelings of others, which influences their behavior, but lack the ability to 
use this information effectively, as indicated by Salovey and Mayer. Essentially, their 
sensitivity to this information does not aid their well being. Why might this occur? Why 
might the key elements of emotional intelligence become a liability? One answer may lie in 
self-concept uncertainty.
Salovey and Mayer (1990) indicate that emotional intelligence does not include a 
general sense of self and appraisal of self and others. However, both they and others 
recognize self-concept is important. Goleman (1995) has suggested that individuals who 
are emotionally intelligent are "more autonomous and sure of their boundaries" (p. 45); 
essentially, they have a clarity, or certainty, about themselves. In contrast, there are those 
he labels as "engulfed" or "accepting"; these individuals are prone to emotional contagion, 
having a very strong tendency to become overly caught up in the emotionality of self and 
others—they are overly sensitive to emotional expression and emotional undertones in 
interactions. Therefore, these individuals do have the ability to experience the emotions of 
others; in fact, due to their sensitivity, others' emotional states may have a heightened 
impact on them, increasing the likelihood that they may become overwhelmed by these 
emotions. However, these individuals lack the ability to use this information to predict, 
guide, and control the behavior of self and others, which Salovey and Mayer (1990) hold 
is an essential ingredient for emotional soundness. Indeed, Goleman (1995) emphasizes 
the difference between being caught up in a feeling and simply being swept away by it.
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Fortunately, many individuals are empathic. Unfortunately, for a minority of these 
individuals, possibly those who have uncertain self-concepts, what might normally aid 
them in social interactions may become a liability. As suggested when postulating a 
connection between self-concept uncertainty and self-esteem lability, lacking a clear 
understanding of oneself might make one particularly sensitive to information perceived as 
self-relevant, whether it is spoken information, written information, or nonverbal 
emotional information. Instead of being the golden path to wellbeing, emotional 
recognition and empathy may be vulnerability factors for depression in individuals who 
lack a clear understanding of who they are, what they want, and how they feel and, in fact, 
tend to lose themselves in the face of others’ emotions. In this way, it is possible that 
emotional sensitivity could become a risk factor for depression through 'emotional 
contagion', or internalization of another's emotional state, essentially, the failure to 
recognize/understand on a cognitive level that another's emotional state is not their own.
In fact, this may become a considerable potential problem when the individual interacts 
closely with someone who is depressed. However, a close interaction with another person 
may not even be necessary for emotional sensitivity to become a liability. For instance, 
individuals lacking certainty about the self or having unstable self-esteem may, in the 
process of scanning the environment for self-relevant information, be overly sensitive to 
the emotions o f self and/or others, and may even misinterpret the relevancy, content, or 
intent of the emotions. In fact, because emotions are probably perceived as having an 
evaluative nature (i.e., anger implies something is wrong, happiness implies everything is 
alright), emotions may be a more salient form of external self-relevant information than 
other verbal information or inferences.
The present study contained two smaller components. Study 1 was an attempt to 
replicate research that has found an association between self-esteem and self-concept
14
certainty and between self-esteem and depression. The first study also sought to extend 
prior research by examining a possible direct relationship between self-concept certainty 
and depression. Study two extended study one by expanding data collection procedures; 
the second study contained a short-term longitudinal component. In previous research, 
most investigations of the relationship between self-concept certainty and self-esteem have 
been cross-sectional in design, or involved the collection of data from the same people at 
only two time points, which does not allow confidence in interpreting influence; these 
investigations simply demonstrated that self-concept uncertainty and poor self-esteem are 
associated.
Study 1
As mentioned previously, study one was an attempt to replicate research that has 
found an association between self-esteem and self-concept certainty and between self­
esteem and depression. The first study also sought to extend prior research by examining a 
possible direct relationship between self-concept certainty and depression.
Method
Participants
Participants were 69 college students enrolled in undergraduate psychology classes 
at the College of William & Mary. All participants were solicited through sign-up sheets 
and received credit in partial fulfillment of class requirements. The data for three 
participants (two males, one female) were not included in the analyses because of 
incomplete or invalid data. Of the remaining participants, there were 30 males and 36 




Self-Concept Certainty; Beck Self-Concept Test (BSCT). The BSCT is a self-
report questionnaire designed and validated by Beck, Steer, Epstein, & Brown (1990) in
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which participants are asked to rate themselves on 25 traits in relation to other people. 
Scale items are ranked on a scale from 1 to 5: (l)worse than nearly everyone I know, 
(2)worse than most people I know, (3)about the same as most people, (4)better than most 
people I know, and (5)better than nearly anyone I know. Sample items included items such 
as memory, athletic ability, and greed, with high scores reflecting a positive self-concept. 
For the present study, mean reaction time in responding to the characteristics included in 
the test served as a measure of self-concept uncertainty, with greater times indicating 
greater uncertainty. In past research, Campbell (1990) has demonstrated that the length of 
time a participant takes to respond to certain self-relevant traits is highly correlated with 
other measures that indicate uncertainty about one's self-concept, including the level of 
one's confidence in possessing characteristics or traits and the temporal stability of 
responses across time periods. Cronbach's alpha for the BSCT items was .63; it was .79 
for the reaction times.
Self-Concept Uncertainty: Self-Concept Clarity (SCC). The SCC was created by 
Campbell et al. (1996), and has 12 items ranked on a 5-point scale anchored by strongly 
disagree (1) and strongly agree (5). This measure is scored so higher scores indicate 
greater certainty. Sample statements include "My beliefs are often in conflict with one 
another" and "In general, I have a clear sense of who I am". Campbell et al. (1996) 
demonstrated that this trait scale is correlated with traits associated with the Big Five 
model of personality, and demonstrated excellent reliability, both through temporal 
stability and internal consistency. Across many samples, participants * SCC scores also 
demonstrated strong correlations with other indicators of self-concept certainty, including
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participants' self-descriptive ratings administered over time (Campbell et al., 1996). For 
further discussions of validity and reliability, see Campbell et al. (1996). For this study, 
Cronbach's alpha was .85.
Self-Concept Uncertainty: Me/Not Me Task. Variations of this measure have been 
created and used by both Baumgardner (1990) and Campbell (1990). Although indices of 
reliability and validity issues have not been as extensively addressed as others used in this 
study, see Baumgardner (1990) for evidence for the concurrent validity and the general 
usefulness of this measure. Participants were randomly presented one component of 
bipolar adjective pairs and ask to respond "y" if they believed that trait described them or 
"n" if it did not. There were 10 pairs, 20 items total: timid/bold, proud/humble, 
cautious/risky conventional/unconventional, calm/nervous, tactful/candid, assertive/soft- 
spoken, deliberate/spontaneous, gentle/boisterous, and extravagant/thrifty. Most of these 
pairs o f traits were chosen because they do not differ greatly in terms of social desirability 
and are not as likely to be instantaneously perceived as positive or negative, unlike some 
of the traits in Beck's self-concept test. One measure of uncertainty was measured as 
'misses' in yeses and nos to opposing pairs. For instance, if a participant indicated that 
generally he or she is both timid and bold, then this individual was scored '2', as uncertain, 
for that trait. Participants who responded that they were timid and not bold were scored as 
'1' or certain. After all ten pairs of traits had been matched and scored, the scores for each 
pair were summed and the mean taken. The lowest mean score a participant could possibly 
have was 1.0; the highest mean score possible was 2.0 (i.e., if he or she had answered 
affirmatively to every adjective). Participants were then dichotomized based on the mean 
for this measure (M= l-43; SD=.16). Individuals with lower means, ranging from one to 
1.43, were classified as more certain; individuals with means closer to two, (ranging from
17
1.43 to two) were considered less certain. Another measure of self-concept uncertainty 
derived from the Me/Not Me Task was reaction time in responding to the trait, with 
longer reaction times indicating greater uncertainty.
Self-Esteem: Self-Esteem Questionnaire. Developed and validated by Rosenberg 
(1965), this frequently used self-report questionnaire contains 10 self-evaluative 
statements. Typical self-statements include "On the whole, I am satisfied with myself,"
"All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure," and "I take a positive attitude toward 
myself." Statements were rated on a 5-point scale anchored by strongly disagree (1) to 
strongly agree (5). For validity and reliability information, see Rosenberg (1965). Scores 
determined participants' global level of self-esteem and higher scores indicate higher levels 
of self regard. Internal consistency for this scale was .78.
Beck Depression Inventory-Short Form (BDI-SF). The short form of BDI (Beck 
& Beck, 1972) has 21 items and is an extensively used measure of depressive symptoms 
with good psychometrics (Butler et al., 1994). The BDI is a frequently used measure with 
good temporal reliability and internal consistency (Beck & Beck, 1972; Beck & Steer,
1989). Beck and colleagues have repeatedly supported the scale’s validity by 
demonstrating BDI scores are strongly related to clinical assessments of depression and 
anxiety, as well as other measures of self-reported symptoms, in both in-patient and out­
patient populations. The questionnaire is designed so that each item has 4 potential 
responses and participants select one. For example, for item one, 0-1  do not feel sad', 1='I 
feel sad', 2 -1  am sad all the time and can't snap out of it', and 3-1 am so sad or unhappy 
that I can't stand it'. For this measure, higher scores are indicative of higher levels of 
negative affect. Cronbach's alpha for this measure was .83. It is important to note that the 
mean score for this measure was 7.26 (SD=5.83), well below the cut-point used to 
identify individuals at risk for depression, indicating that depressive symptomology is not
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very severe for the sample as a whole and very few, if any, of the participants are actually 
depressed.
Procedure
Groups of 2-5 participants were taken into the computer lab as they arrived and 
informed of the general nature of the study, that they could refuse to answer any question, 
and could cease participation at anytime without loss of credit. They were also informed 
that their data would be confidential and names would not be associated with the results of 
the study in any way. If they desired results of the study, they were instructed that they 
could write their addresses on labels provided on the consent form.
After consent forms were signed, the data-collection program was booted and 
participants were familiarized with the data-collection procedures. All measures were 
presented through the Micro-Analytic Experimental Laboratory software package (MEL) 
(Schneider, 1988). MEL has several advantages in presenting questionnaires: Only 
responses within a specific range will be accepted, and also reaction time can be measured, 
which is one method of measuring self-concept certainty. For instance, uncertain self- 
concept individuals may endorse certain characteristics consistently, but they make take 
longer to do so than self-concept certain individuals (Baumgardner, 1990). Before 
starting, everyone was told to work quietly, independently, and at their own pace. After 
the session ended, participants were asked to disclose any hypotheses they may have 
generated, were given more information about the actual hypotheses, and asked if there 
were any remaining questions about the study. Finally, everyone was thanked for 
participating.
Results
Means, standard deviations, and correlations of each measure with one another are 
presented in Table 1. Reaction time measures of self-concept uncertainty using the BSCT
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or the Me/Not Me Task did not correlate with the SCC scale; neither did the means 
generated using the Me/Not Me Task responses. These measures were not utilized in 
subsequent analyses.
As expected, greater certainty in one’s self-concept was positively correlated with 
self-esteem, and self-esteem was negatively correlated with depressive symptomology. In 
addition, higher self-concept certainty scores were also significantly negatively correlated 
with BDI-SF scores.
To explore the relationship between self-concept clarity, self-esteem and risk for 
depression in more depth, a hierarchical regression was conducted with depressive 
symptomology as the outcome variable and self-concept uncertainty and self-esteem as 
predictors; this analysis was conducted to uncover how much unique variance in risk for 
depression each predictor explained. Self-concept uncertainty was entered on the first 
step, followed by self-esteem on the second step. Combined, both predictors explained 
39.5% of the variance, p<.0001. Self-concept uncertainty alone explained 18% of the 
variance. However, self-esteem explained an additional 21% of the variance in depressive 
symptomology above and beyond that explained by self-concept uncertainty (see Table 2).
Study 1 Discussion
As predicted (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell et al., 1990), this study found that 
individuals with lower self-esteem also tended to experience more uncertainty in their 
understanding and thoughts about the self. Also supporting previous research, the current 
study found that individuals having higher self-esteem scores were at lower risk for 
depression. Extending this research, it was found, as hypothesized, that self-concept 
uncertainty was also associated with greater depressive symptomology. However, 
although self-concept uncertainty accounted for a significant percentage of the variance in 
depression scores, self-esteem accounted for the more significant proportion of the overall
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explained variance, an additional percentage beyond that explained by self-concept 
uncertainty. This was somewhat contrary to predictions, but consistent with previous 
research that implicates a strong connection between self-esteem and depression (Butler et 
al., 1994; Harter, 1993).
These results, however, are limited. All measures of self-concept uncertainty 
administered in this study did not intercorrelate; to make matters more confusing, some 
intercorrelated with one measure but not another. Based on results in previous studies, this 
was unexpected, and problematic. One possible explanation is that participants were still 
becoming acquainted with the questionnaire procedure as they responded to the questions 
and this may have influenced both how they responded to the first questions and/or how 
long it took to respond. Therefore, the reaction times measured in this study may not 
actually be measuring an individual's uncertainty regarding possessing certain traits, but 
one's level of familiarity with computerized data-collections procedures, or even one's 
level of familiarity with computers. Unfortunately, no steps were taken to control for this 
possibility, yet it could explain why the reaction time measures failed to correlate with 
other measures of self-concept uncertainty, as found by other researchers (Campbell,
1990).
Most importantly, this study was limited in compass. First, the overall level of 
depression in the sample was very low, indicating that few participants were actually 
depressed, as indexed by the Beck Depression Inventory. In addition, not all measures 
essential to the main hypotheses of the study were included.
Second, this study was one snapshot in time; all measures were administered in the 
same singular session and with only one time of measurement, self-esteem lability could 
not be calculated. In addition, it is impossible at this point to do anything but speculate 
about the direction of causality. This study is important in that it supported previously
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found results and does suggest that self-concept uncertainty is related to depression, but 
could be improved and extended further.
To pursue further the nature of the relationship between self-concept certainty, 
self-esteem lability, and risk for depression, a second study was conducted. In the second 
study data were collected over the course of several weeks, to allow better insight into the 
relationships between the variables of interest. This second study also was designed to 
collect several repeated measures of all variables, including depressive symptomology and 
self-esteem. Finally, measures of emotional recognition and empathy were included in this 
study to assess the association between emotional intelligence, self-concept uncertainty, 
and depression.
Study 2
Overview of Study 2
The second study has two components: a single session at the beginning of the 
study where participants completed multiple questionnaires, called "START." Study 2 
also contained a diary component, called "WEEK," that began approximately a week later. 
This second phase collected short-term longitudinal data twice a week over several weeks 
in order to calculate measures of self-esteem lability, but also to allow more confidence in 
causal conjecture because a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of causality is that 
independent variables must be collected before dependent variables (Feist, Bodner, Jacobs, 
Miles, & Tan, 1995; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991).
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The major hypotheses examined by the present study involve the relationships 
among self-concept uncertainty, self-esteem lability, emotional sensitivity, and depression. 
Essentially, individuals with less certainty about themselves are expected to have higher 
self-esteem lability and report greater depressive symptomology. They are also expected 
to be more sensitive to external emotional information, as demonstrated by recognizing 
the emotional content of faces much better and being more empathetic. The constructs of 
self-concept uncertainty, emotion recognition, and empathy are also expected to explain a 
significant amount of the variance in self-esteem lability scores.
In addition, the constructs of SCC and self-esteem lability are hypothesized to be 
risk factors for depression through their influence on views about the self. Based on 
previous research, including the results found in study one, it is hypothesized that self- 
concept uncertainty will be a significant predictor of variance in depression scores. It is 
also expected that self-esteem lability will account for an additional increase in explained 
variance above and beyond that of self-concept uncertainty.
Method
Participants
In study two, there were 115 participants, 27 males and 84 females. Mean age was 
18.82 (SD=1.11). 5.7% were African American, 2.85% were Hispanic, 6.6% were Asian, 
80.9% were Caucasian and 3.8% described their ethnicity as 'other'. Two-thirds of the 
sample were freshmen, 23.8% sophomores, 3.8% juniors, and 4.8% seniors. Of this 
sample, 35 individuals were specially solicited to participate in the study based upon their 
reports of depressive symptomology as indexed by the CES-D and the Beck Depression 
Inventory. These individuals all scored above the cutpoints of 12 for the BDI and 20 for 
the CES-D. All other participants were solicited through sign-up sheets. All participants 
received credit in full fulfillment of class requirements. There were 11 dropouts. Of these,
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three asked to be removed from the study due to time constraints. The remaining dropouts 
were the result of lost or missing data in the sessions analyzed from the WEEK phase of 
the study.
Measures
See Table 3 for the schedule of measurement.
Self-Concept Uncertainty: Self-Concept Clarity (SCC) As in study one, the Self- 
Concept Clarity scale (Campbell et al., 1996) was given in full-scale form once, at the 
beginning of the present study, during START. The mean was 2.93 (SD=.80).
During the diary phase, called WEEK, participants responded to a shorter version 
of the questionnaires. Item selections were based on factor loadings; the SCC is composed 
of a single factor, therefore the items loading highest on this factor were selected for 
inclusion in the "WEEK" program (Campbell et al., 1996). Loadings were .65 or better for 
these items (Campbell et al., 1996). All statements were on a 7-point scale ranging from 
l=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree and included the following items: "My beliefs 
about myself often conflict with one another," "Sometimes I feel I am not really the person 
I appear to be," "My beliefs about myself seem to change frequently," "If I were to 
describe my personality, my description might end up being different from one day to the 
next." The four items given at each time period were averaged to obtain a mean SCC 
score for each of the first four sessions, resulting in each participant having four SCC 
mean scores. These original four means of interest correlated .70 or higher with one 
another and each mean correlated .60 or higher with the full-scale score obtained from the 
START session (see Table 4). Crohnbach's alpha for the four means was .94. These four 
means were then summed together for each person and divided by four to create a final 
SCC score for each participant. Higher scores indicate more uncertainty about the self.
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Self-Esteem: The Self-Esteem Questionnaire (Rosenberg, 1965) was given in full 
form twice prior to the WEEK component of the present study, once in a mass-testing 
session and again about two weeks later in the START session (or beginning) o f the 
present study. The correlation between these two full-scale administrations of the Self- 
Esteem Questionnaire was .83. Crohnbach's alphas for these two times of measurement 
were both above .92.
The questionnaire was also given in short version, containing four items, during 
the WEEK sessions. The items were presented on a seven-point scale, ranging from 
l=strongly disagree to 4=neither disagree nor agree to 7=strongly agree. Two positively 
worded statements and two negatively worded statements were selected: "All in all, I am 
inclined to feel like a failure," "At times I think I am no good at all," "I take a positive 
attitude towards myself," and "On the whole, I am satisfied with myself." The negatively 
worded items were recoded so that higher scores indicate higher self-esteem. The scores 
for the four items given at each time period were averaged to obtain a mean self-esteem 
score for each of the first four sessions, resulting in each participant having four mean self­
esteem scores. The means for these four times correlated with one another at .74 or 
higher. The four session means also correlated highly with the scores obtained with the 
administrations of the full scale at mass-testing and the START session. When correlating 
the WEEK scores with the mass-testing scores and scores obtained at START, 
correlations ranged between .47 and .60, significant at the .01 level. That these four items 
were representative of the entire scale scores is evidenced by their correlations with the 
full scale. (See Table 5 for means, standard deviations, and correlations.) Crohnbach's 
alpha for the four WEEK means was .94.
Self-Esteem Lability: Participants' scores on the Self-Esteem Questionnaire 
(Rosenberg, 1965) were used to calculate self-esteem lability. Three self-esteem lability
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scores resulted from the calculation of difference scores. The change in self-esteem scores 
between the first time of measurement and the second became one measurement of 
lability; difference scores were also calculated between time two and time three, and time 
three and time four, resulting in three measures of self-esteem lability. The absolute values 
of these scores were then added together to obtain one total measure of lability. Higher 
scores indicated more change across all times of measurement, or greater lability. Also, to 
address the possibility of that self-esteem lability is a better predictor o f risk for depression 
only when its interaction with trait level of self-esteem is considered (Kernis et al., 1991), 
all individuals' mean self-esteem score from the four week sessions were multiplied by 
their total self-esteem lability scores to obtain a trait self-esteem by self-esteem lability 
product term.
Depression: BDI-SF. Described in greater detail above, the BDI-SF (Beck &
Beck, 1972) was given in full form twice prior to the beginning of the WEEK phase of the 
study. One administration was during a mass-testing session in the beginning of the spring 
semester; the second administration occurred approximately two weeks later during the 
START phase of the present study. The correlation between these two administrations 
was .71. For this scale, higher scores indicate higher levels of depressive symptomology. 
This measure was not given in abbreviated version during the WEEK phase.
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-DT Developed by 
Radloff (1977), the CES-D contains 20 statements describing symptoms of depression and 
was designed and validated on non-clinical populations. Items ask participants to indicate 
how often over the past week that they have experienced certain symptoms. Items were on 
a four point scale, ranging from 0, 'rarely or none of the time (less than one day)' to 3,
'most or all o f the time (5-7 days)'. Statements include: 'I had trouble keeping my mind on 
what I was doing,’ 'I had crying spells,' 'I enjoyed life,' and 'I felt sad.' Items were totaled to
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obtain a risk for depression score. Scores obtained from the CES-D can range from 0 to 
60, with higher scores indicating higher levels of depressive symptomology; scores at or 
above 20 are generally considered to be at risk for a depressive episode. This measure was 
given in full form once, during mass-testing. It was not given in the START or WEEK 
phase.
The correlation between the BDI-SF at mass-testing and the CES-D was .82. The 
correlation between the BDI-SF at START and the CES-D was .70. Therefore, these 
measures were converted to z-scores and combined to create a total depression score.
Emotional Recognition: Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES). Developed 
by Mehrabian (1996), this measures sensitivity to and sharing of another's affective 
experience. This measure was adapted from a previous empathy measure, Emotional 
Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS) (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972), to incorporate more of 
the research on empathy that has occurred since the original scale's formulation. For 
internal consistency, Mehrabian (1996) reported an alpha coefficient of .87. BEES is 
highly positively correlated (.77) with the earlier EETS scale. In establishing BEES' 
validity, Mehrabian (1996) found that individuals scoring high in empathy as measured by 
the BEES also were more likely to be physiologically responsive to emotional stimuli, be 
more emotional, and be more altruistic towards others in need. For further discussion of 
reliability and validity, see Mehrabian (1996).
The full scale of BEES was given once, during START, and contains 30 items and 
responses range from -4 (very strong disagreement) to +4 (very strong agreement). The 
scale contains 15 positively and 15 negatively worded items. To compute the total 
empathy score, all the negative items were first summed together, the positive items were 
then summed, and the two scores were combined. A person can, therefore, have either a 
negative or positive empathy score. The mean for the full scale was 1.62 (SD=1.02).
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A shortened version of the BEES scale (Mehrabian, 1997) was administered as a 
part of the diary phase of the present study. For the WEEK sessions, BEES was on a 7- 
point scale, anchored by l=strongly disagree on one end of the scale and 7=strongly agree 
on the opposing end of the scale. All BEES items loaded highly on a single factor labeled 
"emotional empathy" (Mehrabian, personal communication, 1997). Therefore, the four 
items to be included from this scale were selected based on theoretical link to the 
hypotheses of the study; these items focused mainly on vicarious experience of others' 
emotions, emotional contagion. Items included "I did not get overly involved with a 
friend's problem," "The sadness of a close one easily rubbed off on me," "I was not 
affected easily by the strong emotions of people around me," and "Another's happiness 
was very uplifting for me." For the WEEK sessions, the negatively worded items were 
recoded so that higher scores indicated greater empathic tendencies and the items were 
averaged to obtain an empathy score for each session. The WEEK means for these items 
significantly correlated with one another from .41 to .56, all significant at the .01 level.
The four BEES WEEK means were then averaged for each individual to create one final 
grand mean for each participant. The only significant correlation between the WEEK 
means and the full-scale BEES administration was the correlation between the first WEEK 
BEES mean and the BEES scale administered at START, .43. No other WEEK mean 
correlated significantly with the full scale administration. (See Table 6 for means, standard 
deviations and correlations.)
The Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of Emotions (JACFEE). The full 
measure contains 56 color photographs of eight different people depicting seven different 
emotions: anger, disgust, contempt, fear, sadness, surprise, and happiness (Matsumoto & 
Ekman, 1988). There is an equal number of emotional depictions, male and female faces, 
and Asian and Caucasian faces. These slides have been tested extensively across many
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cultures and all faces have been scored using Ekman and Friesen's (1978) Facial Action 
Coding System to insure consistency in muscular display across each of the eight 
expressions for each emotion (Matsumoto & Ekman, 1994). General procedure requires 
the participant to view each slide for a equal amount of time, and then make a judgment of 
which emotion was being expressed. Twelve JACFEE slides of Caucasian people were 
presented in this study, two each depicting anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and 
surprise. Half of the participants received one randomized order; the other half received a 
second randomized order. This measure was given once, during the START session in the 
beginning of the present study. The responses were coded as follows: for a correct 
identification, participants received a "hit" which was scored as a "1"; an incorrect 
identification was scored as a miss and coded as a "0". The total number of hits became 
the person’s accuracy score. Higher scores indicate a better ability to recognize emotions. 
The mean was 10.98 (SD=1.06).
Correlations between JACFEE and BEES (both full scale and WEEK sessions) 
were not significant, and therefore seem to be measuring different components of 
emotional sensitivity. The former appears to be more recognition, whereas the latter 
appears to be more vicarious experience.
Procedure
The second study utilized data collected at several time periods, including data 
collected during a mass-testing session which occurred in the second week of February, 
prior to the present study (see Table 3 for schedule of measurement). At this session, 
participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck & Beck, 1972), the CESD, 
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Questionnaire (1965). Based on their depression scores, 35 
participants were contacted directly by phone and asked to participate in a study described 
as "personal development over time". All other participants signed up for the study based
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on information listed on sign-up sheets. Both groups were presented the same information 
and completed the same measures.
The data for this study were part of a larger study containing three distinct phases. 
The current study utilized data from two of those phases, "START" and "WEEK" (see 
Table 3 for measurement schedule). All individuals first participated in an initial session at 
the beginning of the study, labeled "START." Individuals participated in this session 
during the last week of February. During this initial session, participants completed full- 
scale versions of SCC (Campbell et al., 1996), Self-Esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), BDI-SF 
(Beck & Beck, 1972), Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES) (Mehrabian, 1996). A 
short version of the measure Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of Emotions 
(Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988) was also given during START. At this session, groups of 
six to 15 participants were advised of their rights and given a more detailed description of 
the general nature of the study. After signing consent forms, all participants were assigned 
a computer terminal, given a disk with their subject number on it and given verbal 
instructions on how to begin the computerized data collection program (MEL) (Schneider, 
1988). Participants were told to work quietly, independently, and at their own pace. The 
SCC, Self-Esteem Questionnaire, and the BDI-SF were presented through MEL. BEES 
and JACFEE were presented in paper form. After this session was completed, participants 
were given information concerning Phase II of the study, labeled "WEEK."
The "WEEK" phase of the study was designed as a diary study and involved 
repeated sessions over several weeks. The program completed at every session contained 
many scales, including short versions of the Self-Esteem Questionnaire (Rosenberg, 1965), 
SCC (Campbell et al., 1996), and BEES (Mehrabian, 1996). The number o f items per 
scale were limited to four items due to the fact that participants were expected to run the 
program twice a week. This decision was made partially because it was decided that
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including abbreviated scales was more desirable to having participants becoming 
inattentive, bored, or frustrated with programs that were too long, which has the potential 
for resulting in poorer quality data. The four items chosen from each scale were selected 
based on previously published factor analysis data and/or theoretical reasons (see above 
for more detail).
The "WEEK” phase ran from February 26 to April 24. In this phase the 
participants took home a pre-programmed disk and ideally completed the questions 
included in the program twice a week for ten weeks, on Wednesday and Sunday evenings. 
Participants were given instructions on how to access the "WEEK" program from any 
IBM compatible computer and told what to expect once it began running. These 
instructions were also distributed to the participants on an instruction sheet that they could 
take with them to refresh their memories. They were then given a disk with the two 
researchers' names, phone numbers, and email addresses printed on the front. The front of 
the disk also contained their subject number, which they were informed would be used 
when accessing the programs. Participants were instructed on procedure concerning 
"missed" days and were told that they would be reminded by email the day before to use 
the program on Wednesdays and Sundays; participants were also instructed to call or 
email us with any problems or concerns. For instance, if a participant missed running the 
program on Wednesday, they were told to email either experimenter as soon as possible 
and run WEEK on Thursday, but no later; they then completed the program on Sunday as 
usual to get back on the schedule. Also, participants were instructed to contact either 
researcher at any time regarding any other problems, questions or concerns about the 
study.
At two points in the "WEEK" phase, all participants had to return to the 
experimenter to exchange old disks and pick up new disks. The first exchange was due to
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a minor program malfunction. The data collected prior to this first exchange of disks was 
not used in the present study. The second exchange was pre-planned and had been 
explained to participants prior to their consent to the study. This exchange occurred half 
way through the WEEK phase, which then continued for five more weeks, with 
participants continuing to run the program on Wednesdays and Sundays. This was 
scheduled for several reasons, including to check student participation. For the purpose of 
this study, WEEK sessions between March 5 and April 24 were used. However, 
participation became much more sporadic after the first few sessions; some participants 
followed the session schedule very closely, while others skipped several sessions and 
resumed participation after some amount of time had elapsed. To make matters more 
complicated, some individuals skipped only one or two sessions, while others skipped 
almost a month, creating unequal intervals between sessions among participants. 
Fortunately, most individuals did complete the first diary sessions as instructed. Therefore, 
to avoid the potential problem of varying intervals among participants, participants' first 
four sessions were used to provide data for the present study. In addition, Kernis et al. 
(1991, 1992, 1993) had also collected data over a four day period in previous research.
For the analyses in the current study, all participants had four sessions. For most 
individuals, these sessions ran between March 5 and March 25. The average intervals 
between these four sessions ranged from 4.45 days (SD=2.43) to 4.68 days (SD=2.55); 
most individuals had intervals of four to five days (as expected), although an occasional 
interval for a minority of participants was as short as three days or as long as six days. Any 
participant who deviated significantly from the average, or had multiple sessions 
completed on the same date, was eliminated from analyses.
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Results
See Table 7 for means, standard deviations and correlations among self-concept 
uncertainty, self-esteem lability, emotional recognition, empathy, and symptoms of 
depression. The mean for the administration of the BDI-SF at mass-testing was 9.90 
(SD=8.09). The mean for the BDI-SF at START was 9.06 (SD=8.14). The mean for the 
CES-D was 19.10 (SD=13 .23). These sample scores are close to, but still below, the 
generally accepted cut-point for the BDI-SF and CES-D, respectively. Therefore, 
although a portion of the participants in this study were selected based on their scores on 
these scales, very few, if any, of this sample is actually clinically depressed.
As expected, many of the variables of interest were significantly correlated. As 
expected, SCC was significantly correlated with global self-esteem (r(104)=-.75, p<01), 
self-esteem lability (r(104)=. 23, p< 05) and BEES (emotional empathy) (r(104)=.24, 
p< 05); SCC was also highly correlated with depressive symptomology (r(87)=.70,
P< 01). Global self-esteem was also significantly negatively correlated with depression 
(r(90)=-.62). Contrary to predictions, self-esteem lability did not correlate with risk for 
depression and the two measures of emotional sensitivity, BEES and JACFEE, did not 
correlate with each other, self-esteem lability, or depression. The self-esteem level x 
stability product term correlated with the measure of self-esteem lability (r(106) = .93, p < 
.01.; it failed to significantly correlate with symptoms of depression.
To explore the relationships between the variables more fully, data were analyzed
through hierarchical linear regression. The first regression conducted addressed the
/
hypothesis concerning the ability of SCC and emotional sensitivity to predict the variance 
in self-esteem lability scores (see Table 8). In the first step SCC was entered, followed by 
empathy (BEES) and emotional recognition (JACFEE). All three predictor variables 
together predicted nine percent of the total variance in self-esteem lability scores, p< .05.
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Self-concept uncertainty alone accounted for 5% (sr2= 04); empathy explained one 
additional percent above that explained by self-concept uncertainty and emotion 
recognition (sr2 =.01), and emotional recognition explained an additional three percent 
above and beyond that explained by self-concept uncertainty (sr2= 03).
A second hierarchical regression was conducted with depression as the outcome 
variable to address the hypothesized relationships between self-concept uncertainty, and 
the two measures of emotional sensitivity, and self-esteem lability (see Table 9). In the 
first step on the regression, self-concept certainty was entered into the regression. 
Empathy was entered in the second step, followed by emotional recognition. Self-esteem 
was entered on the fourth step, followed by self-esteem lability, then the self-esteem level 
by self-esteem lability product term. Combined, the six predictor variables explained 50% 
of the variance, F(4, 84)=20.31, p< 0001. Upon closer inspection, however, it was 
revealed that self-concept uncertainty was the only variable to explain a significant amount 
of the variance in depressive symptomology. However, the amount of variance explained 
by trait self-esteem over and above self-concept uncertainty approached significance 
(sr2=.02, p= 06). The other variables, empathy, emotional recognition, self-esteem lability 
and the self-esteem level by stability interaction term combined explained less than 1% 
additional variance. This analysis was conducted again using only the depressed 
subsample. Global level of self-esteem still approached significance (sr2=.08, p < .06). 
Again, neither self-esteem lability nor the self-esteem level by stability product explained 
any additional variance in depressive symptomology.
Study 2 Discussion
There were two main hypotheses in study 2. The first hypothesis concerned self­
esteem lability. It was expected that self-concept uncertainty and the two measures of 
emotional sensitivity all would be significant predictors of variance in self-esteem lability.
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Although each variable was not significant by itself, all three predictor variables explained 
a small, but statistically significant amount of variance in the outcome variable together, 
with self-concept uncertainty being the strongest predictor, as expected. There was a 
positive significant correlation between self-concept uncertainty and self-esteem lability; 
when self-concept uncertainty was regressed upon self-esteem lability it did explain a 
significant, if small, percentage of the variance. Additional variance in self-esteem lability 
was explained by emotional recognition and empathy. There was also a significant 
correlation between self-concept certainty and empathy.
One interpretation of these findings suggests the construct of self-concept 
uncertainty does offer a plausible explanation for why some individuals demonstrate 
lability in self-esteem and why other individuals are not as prone to this instability. 
Previous research (Brockner, 1984; Butler et al., 1994; Campbell et al., 1991) found that 
many people are more dependent on, susceptible to, and influenced by both negative and 
positive external self-relevant stimuli. The influence these experiences have on most 
individuals is probably insignificant and transient. However, lacking a clearly, consistently 
and confidently defined sense of self can make negotiating daily life very difficult when 
individuals are exposed to many different situations, ideas and people. For instance, an 
example of a situation with positive implications would be to win the lottery; having one’s 
car break down undoubtedly has negative ramifications. Furthermore, almost everyday, 
most people have contact with others who both like them and dislike them, and these 
people may be very verbal about their preferences. In fact, daily life often puts us in 
contact with others who are both happy and others who are frustrated or angry, and these 
moods may have absolutely nothing to do with us! In fact, although previous research has 
operationalized external sources of information as stressful life events and actual 
comments made by others, the present study suggests that, in certain situations, the
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operationalization of external stimuli may be extended to emotional information as well; 
people with uncertain self-concepts were more sensitive to the emotions of others and this 
empathy was associated with instability in self-esteem. It appears that individuals with 
poorly defined self-concepts seem to be at an increased risk for the moods, sentiments, 
and statements of others to have a stronger impact on their feelings, even their feelings 
about themselves.
Second, self-concept uncertainty was hypothesized to be risk factor for depression 
through its influence on views about the self. Erikson's (1950) theory of psychosocial 
development emphasizes self-knowledge as essential to psychological health and well 
being. This view continues to be advocated today by individuals such as Baumgardner 
(1990), who postulates that certainty about the self is necessary for the promotion and 
maintenance of positive affect about the self The strong connections between self-concept 
uncertainty and depressive symptomology found in this study support this view.
Individuals lacking a clear, confident, certain sense of themselves had higher levels of 
depression. As suggested before, if one is not sure of one's traits or abilities, one is a poor 
master of one's life. When exposed to self-related information that is negative, an 
individual with more uncertainty about who they are may not be able to readily access 
confident views about the self to refute this negative view. Also, self-concept uncertainty 
is a basic lack of clear knowledge of or confidence in the basic attributes of the self; 
therefore, individuals high on this trait are less likely to have the ability to self-select 
situations or activities at which they might excel and avoid those at which they probably 
will fail. Because of this, they may face exposure to repeated negative evaluations and 
failures in various domains, which is undoubtedly a sure pathway to more negative views 
of the self and an increased likelihood of depression.
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The relationship between self-concept uncertainty, self-esteem lability and risk for 
depression was not quite as clear cut as expected, however. Self-concept uncertainty and 
self-esteem lability were correlated, as previously mentioned. Quite unexpectedly, 
however, self-esteem lability, as measured in this study, did not explain any additional 
variance in depressive symptomology scores over and above self-concept uncertainty. In 
fact, self-esteem lability was not correlated with depression at all! This is in direct contrast 
to previous research (Butler et al., 1994; Roberts & Monroe, 1992) who found that self­
esteem lability was a very significant predictor for depression-proneness. One possible 
interpretation of this result is that self-esteem lability is not a vulnerability factor for 
depression, or at least is not as strong as suggested by Butler and colleagues (1994) . 
However, it is important to note several possible alternative explanations. In their study, 
Butler and colleagues (1994) differentiated their participants into groups: currently 
depressed, previously depressed, and never depressed, which the present study did not do. 
The current study did have a small subsample of depressed individuals, however. Post hoc 
analyses on this subsample alone still failed to replicate Butler and colleague’s (1994) 
finding that self-esteem lability was a significant predictor of depression.
Another area in which Butler et al.’s (1994) study differed from the current study 
is that they followed their participants over a time period of five months whereas the 
present study took place over the course of a few weeks. However, in their study, Butler 
et al. (1994) found that self-esteem lability often did not differ between depressed and 
non-depressed groups, especially the previously depressed and the never depressed, during 
shorter time periods, such as 30 days; in fact, they found self-esteem lability often 
remained elevated among vulnerable participants even when depression had remitted. 
Therefore, although the mean depression level of the sample did not reach the level of 
clinical depression, it is possible that some portion of the sample had considerable self­
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esteem lability but was not currently depressed. Given the extended time period of Butler 
et al.'s (1994) research compared to the current study, the findings of this study could 
indicate that the predictive power of self-esteem lability may not be evident in shorter-term 
studies; it is possible that depression scores collected on the same subjects in the present 
study five months in the future may replicate Butler et al.’s (1994) results. It is also 
important to note that Butler and colleagues (1994) measured self-esteem lability 
somewhat differently than it was measured in the present study. In their study, they used a 
very intricate procedure of derivation that involved determining the impact of positive and 
negative daily events on each person’s daily self-esteem, while controlling for general 
trends in those self-esteem scores from the previous day (see Butler et al. (1994) for more 
details). This difference, too, could help explain the present study’s failure to replicate 
their results. Further research should be conducted to explore these possibilities.
The present study also failed to support Kernis et al. (1991),/who found that self­
esteem lability moderates the relationship between self-esteem and depression. Like results 
reported by Roberts and Monroe (1995), the current study found that the interaction of 
self-esteem instability and trait self-esteem did not explain a significant amount of variance 
in risk for depression. They did find, however, that level of self-esteem predicted 
depressive symptoms, irrespective of lability in self-esteem; self-esteem lability failed to 
explain variance in depressive symptoms over and above level of self-esteem. These results 
are more in line with those found in the current study. Although the variance in symptoms 
of depression explained by trait of self-esteem was not quite statistically significant, trait 
self-esteem was the only other variable to explain any additional variance over and above 
that explained by self-concept uncertainty. These results continued to hold in post hoc 
analyses conducted with the depressed subsample.
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The second surprising finding in this study was the failure of emotional empathy 
and emotional recognition to significantly correlate. Salovey and Mayer (1989, 1990) had 
suggested that emotional intelligence is a coherent construct that includes the ability to 
recognizing emotions in others and understanding these emotions (empathy). Salovey and 
Mayer (1990) did, however, suggest that component skills may not be intercorrelated. The 
results of this study suggest that this may be true, at least for the components of emotional 
recognition and empathy. In fact, even many of the empathy scores failed to correlate. It is 
important to note, however, that not all the empathy scores obtained during the diary 
session correlated with the full-scale scores. The first diary session mean did correlate with 
the full-scale scores but the scores from sessions two, three, and four did not correlate 
with the full-scale scores. However, all diary session scores did correlate with one another. 
It is possible that the four items chosen from the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale for 
the diary sessions were not representative of the full-scale, despite Mehrabian’s (1996) 
decision to include them in the scale based on prior factor analyses. However, this finding 
may have been due to the fact that empathy fluctuates over time. Further research should 
be conducted to explore this possibility.
Another expectation of this study was to find a direct association between 
emotional sensitivity and depression. This hypothesis was partially based on previous 
research by Feist and Barron (1996), who found that "personal soundness," their 
operationalization of emotional intelligence, did not predict life satisfaction. In interpreting 
this finding, the authors suggested that emotional sensitivity might be associated with 
negative affect. The present study also expected emotional sensitivity to be related to 
depression because previous research has found that people with less certain self-concepts 
are more sensitive to external information than people with more certain self-concepts 
(Campbell et al., 1990). Based on other research (Brockner, 1984; Sullins, 1991), it was
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expected that emotional information might serve as an additional source of external 
information, especially for individuals with unclear self-concepts.
Contrary to expectations, the present study did not find the hypothesized 
relationship between emotional sensitivity and risk for depression. Neither empathy nor 
emotion recognition correlated with depressive symptomology; in fact, the measure of 
emotion recognition failed to correlate significantly with any other measure. In 
explanation, it should be noted that there appears to be a ceiling effect for recognizing 
emotion. Some individuals misidentified disgust or fear, but almost everyone correctly 
labeled happiness or sadness. In fact, the highest possible score on this measure was 12; 
the mean was close to 11, with very little variance in accuracy. Although the use of overall 
accuracy scores is the most widely accepted method of using the JACFEE slides, one 
possible alternative way to explore certain emotions individually. For instance, it is 
possible that there may be an association between depression and accuracy at identifying 
sadness or other negative emotions. Or, individuals with depressive symptomology may be 
more likely to display a certain pattern of inaccurately identifying many emotions as 
sadness or anger. This speculation awaits empirical investigation.
However, although the current study did not show direct support for the 
hypothesis concerning emotion sensitivity and depressive symptomology, empathy was 
significantly correlated with self-concept uncertainty. Self-concept uncertainty was also, as 
expected, a significant predictor of self-esteem lability. Therefore, although the present 
study failed to find emotional sensitivity to be a direct risk factor for depression, empathy, 
in particular, may be an indirect influence through its association with self-concept 
uncertainy and self-esteem lability. Further, it could be argued that the current evidence 
contradicts Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) view that components of emotional intelligence 
are the cornerstone to a healthy personality and essential to emotional wellbeing;
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individuals who experience lability in their self-esteem, by definition, experience highs and 
lows in their feelings about themselves.
The most important result of the present study was the relationship between self- 
concept uncertainty and symptoms of depression; self-concept uncertainty explained a full 
one-half of the variance in these scores. This suggests that uncertainty about the self is a 
major factor in risk for depression. Given the rising levels of depression in our society, this 
is an important finding to explore, especially in the sense that it may offer insight into the 
prevention of the depression. For instance, it is possible to conceive of self-concept 
uncertainty as a form of dysfunctional thinking (i.e., the individual is unsure of even traits 
he or she obviously has). Prior research has also suggested talking and writing extensively 
about the self may provide individuals greater insight and certainty about their identities, 
which affords them a sense of control and positive affect (Baumgardner, 1990). For more 
severe cases, this might especially be beneficial when guided by a trained professional 
within a structured program. Beck has demonstrated that cognitive therapy may be helpful 
in preventing or halting a relapse into a depressive episode by restructuring the way the 
individual thinks about him or herself. It is possible that this might be one course of action 
in cases where self-concept uncertainty is an underlying cause of negative affect.
However, preventive medicine even could be something as simple as developing a hobby 
or involvement in close-knit social group/club—one thing with which to identify and enjoy; 
either could help to ground one’s self-concept and temper uncertainty and depression 
(Pelham, 1991).
Finally, it is important to recognize the many limitations of the current study. 
Erikson (1968) has suggested that one task essential to wellbeing is the achievement of a 
well-defined identity. According to his theory this task is the main issue during late
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adolescence and early adulthood. At this time in their lives, many individuals "search for 
some inspiring unification of tradition..., ideas, and ideals" (1968, p. 130), seeking to 
merge all their prior experiences, social roles, and identity elements into a final central 
identity. Before achieving identity formation, Erikson indicated that many individuals may 
first experience what he labels "identity crisis" (p. 131), and/or identity confusion, a time 
during which individuals do not have a clear sense of who they are; their thoughts may be 
filled with doubt and conflict about their identities in many domains. In the current study, 
the participants were all older adolescence and young adults, all theoretically at the 
developmental time period in their lives during which the search for identity is likely to be 
a major issue. It is possible, therefore, that the scale purporting to be measuring self- 
concept uncertainty may be measuring elements of identity crisis or confusion; if the same 
participants were contacted for a follow-up study ten, five, or even two years later, the 
results of the current study may not hold. Future research should explore this issue by 
conducting studies with older adult populations.
It is also important to recognize that Erikson (1959) has also pointed out that 
identity crises are not always long-term or irreversible and may actually be beneficial, 
permitting a flexibility about the self allowing for the "searching and playful engagement of 
new opportunities and associations" (p. 116). Therefore, just as some individuals emerge 
from an identity crisis and do achieve identity formation, individuals with self-concept 
uncertainty may also stabilize at some point, and, in fact, experience long-term benefits in 
adjustment; instability can also indicate greater flexibility in one's views of the self. 
Flexibility in one's conceptualizations of the self has been labeled as advantageous because 
one can take on many different roles, making them better able to meet various situational 
demands (Paulus & Martin, 1988). Longitudinal investigations of self-concept uncertainty 
in young adults should be conducted to address this issue.
42
There are also two methodological issues in the current study that need to be 
addressed. First, to calculate self-esteem lability scores, the present study used difference 
scores instead of standard deviations as used by many previous researchers (Kernis et al., 
1991; Kernis et al., 1993; Roberts & Monroe, 1992; Roberts et al., 1995). The decision to 
use the absolute difference method in the present study based partially on the use of this 
method in previous research (Baumgardner, 1990; Campbell, 1990). Although both 
methods essentially measure instability (change, fluctuations, deviations), it is possible that 
utilizing this different method of measurement may have had some impact on the failure of 
the present study to replicate findings by Kernis et al. (1991). In addition, another 
important issue that must be addressed involves the number of sessions included in the 
study. In the present study, four sessions were chosen based on the characteristics o f the 
data. There was some concern because a portion of the sample skipped several days, and 
even weeks between sessions. Rather than risking introducing potentially unrelated, 
unpredictable confounding variables into the study, the number of sessions utilized were 
limited and some of the individuals were excluded from the analyses, which may have also 
created problems. Although four measures of each variable are better than one, it is 
possible that even four sessions are limited. Campbell et al. (1996) did offer evidence for 
the temporal stability of the SCC; the other researchers also addressed this issue with their 
perspective measures. Individual’s responses to the same questions undoubtedly vary from 
day to day. Multiple measures of a variable are more desirable due to increased reliability. 
Therefore, it is possible that including an additional number of sessions in the current 
study may influence the results in some way. More sessions can also be important to gain 
an understanding of how levels of many constructs may vary at different assessments. For 
instance, in the current study, there is evidence that levels of empathy may fluctuate over
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time.
It is also important to note that the gender ratio in the second study was almost 
three-to-one, favoring females. It possibly could be suggested that the high correlation 
between self-concept uncertainty and depression may be due, in some way, to the unequal 
distribution of gender, except that self-concept uncertainty was positively correlated with 
greater depression in Study 1 as well, where the gender ratio was almost equal. However, 
to address this issue, post hoc analyses were conducted to examine the relationships 
among self-concept uncertainty, self-esteem lability, and depression for both genders 
individually. For data in both Study 1 and Study 2, the results for women as a group and 
men as a group replicated the findings for the whole samples in every analyses except for 
one regression in Study 2. When analyzing the entire sample in Study 2, it was found that 
self-concept uncertainty, emotional recognition, and empathy together explained a 
significant percentage of the variance in self-esteem lability. When this regression was 
conducted using males only from the sample in Study 2, this finding was not replicated. 
Given that all other results were replicated using the male sub sample, this was an 
unexpected finding. This suggests that the relationship between self-concept uncertainty 
and the emotion recognition variables with depression found in the larger sample may be 
due to solely to the larger female subsample. Mehrabian (1996) has found that females 
tend to score higher on emotional measures, especially empathy, as indicated by higher 
mean scores. Upon closer inspection, this too, was found in the current study; males, 
overall tended to have lower overall empathy scores. Self-concept uncertainty, emotional 
recognition and empathy together only explained 9% of the total variance in self-esteem 
lability, with self-concept uncertainty explaining the most variance and the emotional 
recognition variables explaining very little above self-concept uncertainty. Given this over­
all finding, it is possible that the lower empathy scores for males was enough to decrease
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the predictive power of the three variables together in the male subsample.
Finally, it is also important to recognize is that although it makes sense to describe 
self-esteem lability and self-concept uncertainty as "causes" of depression, it is possible 
that this direction may be reversed or some third variable may cause them both. For 
instance, there is evidence that some forms of depression are biochemical, which suggests 
that they may occur as a result of malfunctions in the production of or absorption of 
neurotransmitter, not due solely to social reasons. Depressed people often experience 
uncertainty and feel they are lacking basic control over their lives (Abramson et al., 1978) 
and may perceive and recall events selectively, to be more consistent with their negative 
affect. Therefore, it is possible that depression may develop first, as a bi-product of 
biochemical deficiencies, leading to fluctuations in both self-concept and self-esteem. 
Further research should address this issue to further clarify the strong association between 
self-concept uncertainty and depression.
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Table 1
Study 1: Means. Standard Deviations, and Correlations between Measures
SCC Me/Not Me/Not BSCT Self-
Me(mean) Me(rt)+ (rt) Esteem Depression
Self-Concept
Certainty:
1. s e e -.13 .10 .02 .55* -.43*
(M=3.12
SD=.64)
























Study 1: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting 
Depressive Symptomologv
Predictor R2 R2
Variable cumulative change Beta sr2
Self-Concept .18 .18 -.43* .01
Uncertainty
Self-Esteem .39 .21 -.62* .21








(Second week in 
February)
"START"


































Study 2 : Means. SD. and Correlations for Measures of SCC
1 2 3 4 5
1. SCC mean 
(M=3.45, 
SD=1.49)
- .74* .74* .70* .60*
2 . SCC mean 
(M=3.46, 
SD=1.62)
*m00 *o00 .6 6 *
3. SCC mean 
(M=3.43, 
SD=1.56)
.8 6 * .6 8 *








* £ < 0 0 1  (two-tailed).
Ns range from 101 to 104.
Note. 1-4 are session means, in temporal order; 'SCC' denotes the full-scale measure given 
in START phase of Study 2.
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Table 5
Study 2: Means» SDs. and Correlations for Measures of Self-Esteem
1 2 3 4 5 6
75* .84* .81* .58* .60*




*£ < 0 . 0 1  (two-tailed).





















Note. 1-4 are session means, in temporal order; SE (MT) administered in mass-testing 
session; SE (START) administered in START phase of study.
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Table 6
Study 2: Means. SDs. and Correlations for Measures of Emotional Sensitivity
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 . BEES 
(M=4.05, 
SD=1.17)
- .40* .41* .42* .43* . 1 0
2 . BEES 
(M=4.12, 
SD=1.01)














6 . JACFEE 
(M= 10.97, 
SD=1.06)
*P < 0  01  (two-tailed).
Ns ranged from 8 8  to 106.
Note. 1-4 are session means, in temporal order; BEES (START) was full scale measure 
administered in START phase of study.
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Table 7
Study 2: Correlations Between All Major Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
1. SCC - .24* -.09 -.75** .23* . 0 2  .70**
(M=2.94 
SD=.80)
2. BEES -.05 .22* .12 .14 .07
(M=1.62
SD=1.02)













Level x Stability - -.01
7. Total Depression
*p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
* * p < 0 . 0 1  (two-tailed).
Ns range between 87 to 106.
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Table 8
Study 2: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Self- 
Esteem Lability
Predictor R2 R2
Variable cumulative change Beta sr2
1 . Self-Concept
Uncertainty .05 .05 .20* .05
2. Emotional
Recognition .08 .03 -.17* .03
(JACFEE)
3. Empathy
(BEES) .09 .01  .09* .01




Study 2: Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting 
Symptoms of Total Depression
Predictor R2 R2
Variable cumulative change Beta sr
1. Self-Concept
Uncertainty .50 .50 .71* .45
2. Emotional
Recognition .50 .00 .08 .01
(JACFEE)
3. Empathy .50 .00 -.01 .00
(BEES)
4. Self-Esteem .50 .02 -.23 .05
5. Self-Esteem
Lability .50 . 0 0  .04 .00
6 . Self-Esteem 
Level X
Lability .50 .01 -.46 .01




Study 1: Consent Form 
The general nature of the study by Carol Wilson has been explained to me. I 
understand that I will be asked to complete a series of computerized questionnaires. I 
further understand that my responses will be confidential and that my name will not be 
associated with any results of this study. I have been informed that I may refuse to 
answer any question I find personably objectionable and that I may discontinue 
participation at any time. I further understand that any grade, credit, or payment for 
participation will not be affected by my responses or by my exercising of any of my 
rights. I am aware that I may report any dissatisfaction with any aspect o f this study to 
Dr. Robert Johnston, Psychology Department Chair. I also understand that I must be 18 
years or older to take part in this study. By signing, I am declaring that my participation 







Study 2: Consent Form 
The general nature of this repeated measurement personality study conducted by 
Rebecca Plesko and Carol Wilson has been explained to me. I understand that there are 
three phases to the study, START, WEEK, and FINISH. In each phase, I will be 
answering short questionnaires (sentence completions and personality items) on the 
computer, and I know the entire study runs over ten weeks. I further understand that my 
responses will be confidential and that my name will not be associated with any results 
of the study. I know that I may discontinue participation at any time. I also understand 
that any grade, payment, or credit for participation will not be affected by my responses 
or by my exercising of my rights. I am aware that I may report dissatisfaction with any 
aspect of this experiment to the Psychology Department Chair. I am aware that I must 
be at least 18 years old to participate. My signature below signifies my voluntary 
participation in this project.
Date _____________________________________________________________
Signature PRINT NAME






Self-Concept Clarity (Campbell et al., 1996)
Please rate yourself on the following statements using the follow scale, by circling the 
number which best describes you.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree nor Agree
Disagree
1. My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another.
2. On one day I might have one opinion of myself and on another day I might have a
different opinion.
3 .1 spend a lot o f time wondering about what kind of person I really am.
4. Sometimes I feel that I am not really the person I appear to be.
5. When I think about the kind of person I have been in the past, I am not sure what I
was really like.
6 . I seldom experience conflict between different aspects of my personality.
7. Sometimes I think I know other people better than I know myself.
8 . My beliefs about myself seem to change frequently.
9. If I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end up being
different from one day to another day.
10. Even if I wanted to, I don't think I could tell people what I am really like.
11. In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am.
12. It is often hard for me to make up my mind about things because I really don't know
what I want.
Self-Concept Test (Beck, 1990)
Please use the following scale to indicate to the degree to which you have the following 
traits/or how well the following traits describe you. Circle the number which best 
describes you in relation to other people.
1 2 3 4 5
1)Better than anyone I know
2)Better than most people I know
3)About the same as most people I know
4)Worse than most people I know





























This is a trait that many people have to varying degrees. Please indicate whether or not 
you think this trait describes you by pressing the 'y' key for yes and the 'n' key for no.
'y'= yes, this trait describes me










1 0 . candid
1 1 . asssertive










2 0 . thrifty
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and 
charcteristics. Please read each statement and consider to the extent to which you agree 
or disagree with it.
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree nor Agree
Disagree
1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.
2 . 1 feel like a person who has a number of good qualities.
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel like a failure.
4 . 1 feel as if I am able to do things as well as most other people.
5 .1 feel as if I do not have much to be proud of.
6. 1 take a positive attitude towards myself.
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
8 . 1 wish I could have more respect for myself.
9 .1 certainly feel useless at times.
10. At times I think I am no good at all.
Beck Depression Inventory
Please read this statement carefully. Then pick out the one statement in each group that 
describes the way you have been feeling in the past week, including today! Be sure to 
read all the statements in a group before making a choice.
1. 0 I do not feel sad.
1 I feel sad.
2 I am so sad all the time and I can't snap out of it.
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.
2. 0 I am not particularly discouraged about the future.
1 I feel discouraged about the future.
2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to.
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and things cannot improve.
3. 0 1 do not feel like a failure.
1 I feel I have failed more than the average person.
2 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures.
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Appendix B (continued)
3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person.
4 .0 1  get as much satisfaction out of things as I need to.
1 I don't enjoy things the way I used to.
2 I don't get any real satisfaction out of anything anymore.
3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything.
5 .0 1  don't feel particularly guilty.
1 1 feel guilty a good part of the time.
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time.
3 I feel guilty all of the time.
6 . 0 I don't feel as if I am being punished.
1 I feel I may be punished.
2 I expect to be punished.
3 I feel I am being punished.
7. 0 I don't feel disappointed in myself.
1 I am disappointed in myself.
2 I am disgusted with myself.
3 I hate myself.
8 .0 1  don't feel I am any worse than anybody else.
1 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes.
2 I blame myself all the time for my faults.
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens.
9. 0 I don't have thoughts of killing myself.
1 I have thoughts of killings myself, but I would never carry them out.
2 I would like to kill myself.
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance.
10. 0 I don't cry anymore than usual.
1 I cry more now than I used to.
2 I cry all the time now.
3 I used to be able to cry, but now I can't even cry though I want to.
11. 0 I am no more irritated now than I ever am.
1 I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to.
2 I feel irritated all the time now.
3 I don't get irritated by all the things that used to irritate me.
12. 0 I have not lost interest in other people.
1 I am less interested in other people than I used to be.
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people.
3 I have lost all of my interest in other people.
13.01 make decisions about as well as I ever could.
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Appendix B (continued)
1 I put off making decisions more than I used to.
2 I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before.
3 I can't make decisions at all anymore.
14. 0 I don't feel I look any worse than I used to.
1 I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive.
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me look 
unattractive.
3 I believe that I look ugly.
15. 0 I can work about as well as before.
1 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something.
2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything.
3 I can't do any work at all.
16. 0 I can sleep about as well as usual.
1 I don't sleep as well as I used to.
2 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep.
3 I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep.
17. 0 I don't get more tired than usual.
1 I get tired more easily than I used to.
2 I get tired from doing almost anything.
3 I am too tired to do anything.
18.0 My appetite is not worse than usual.
1 My appetite is not as good as it used to be.
2 My appetite is much worse now.
3 I have no appetite at all anymore.
19. 0 I haven't lost much weight, if any, lately.
1 I have lost more than 5 pounds.
2 I have lost more than 10 pounds.
3 I have lost more than 15 pounds.
20. 0 I am no more worried about my health than usual.
1 1 am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains, or upset stomach, or 
constipation.
2 I am very worried about physical problems and it is hard to think of much else.
3 I am so worried about physical problems that I cannot think about anything else.
2 1 . 0 1  have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
2 I am much less interested in sex now.
3 I have lost interest in sex completely.
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Appendix B (continued)
Center for Epidemiological Studies- 
Depression Scale (CES-D) (Radloff, 1977)
Below is a list of the ways you might have felt or behaved. Please indicate how often 
you felt this way during the past week.
0 = Rarely or None of the Time (less than one day)
1 = Some or a Little of the Time ( 1- 2  days)
2  = Occasionally or a Moderate Amount of Time (3-4 days)
3 = Most or All of the Time (5-7 days)
1 . 1 was bothered by things that usually don't bother me.
2 . 1 did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor.
3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or friends.
4 .1 felt that I was just as good as other people.
5 .1 had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing.
6 . 1 felt depressed.
7 .1 felt that everything I did was an effort.
8 . 1 felt hopeful about the future.
9 .1 thought my life had been a failure.
10. I felt fearful.
11. My sleep was restless.
12. I was happy.
13.1 talked less than usual.
14. I felt lonely.
15. People were unfriendly.
16. I enjoyed life.
17. I had crying spells.
18 .1 felt sad.
19 .1 felt that people disliked me.
20. I could not ‘get going.’
Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (Mehrabian, 1996)
Please read the following statements carefully. Then indicate to what degree you 
agree with each statement.
+4 = very strong agreement 
+3 = strong agreement 
+ 2  = moderate agreement 
+ 1  = slight agreement 
0  = neither agreement or disagreement 
-1 = slight disagreement 
- 2  = moderate disagreement 
-3 = strong disagreement 
-4 = very strong disagreement
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Appendix B (continued)
1 . 1 very much enjoy and feel uplifted by happy endings.
2 . 1 cannot feel much sorrow for those who are responsible for their own misery.
3 .1 am moved deeply when I observe strangers who are struggling to survive.
4. I hardly ever cry when watching a very sad movie.
5 .1 can almost feel the pain of elderly people who are weak and must struggle to move 
about.
6 . 1 cannot relate to the crying and sniffling at weddings.
7. It would be extremely painful for me to have to convey very bad news to another.
8 . I cannot easily empathize with the hopes and aspirations of strangers.
9. I don’t get caught up easily in the emotions generated by a crowd.
10. Unhappy movies endings haunt me for hours afterward.
11. It pains me to see young people in wheelchairs.
12. It is very exciting for me to watch children open presents.
13. Helpless old people don’t have much of an emotional effect on me.
14. The sadness of a close one easily rubs off on me.
15.1 don’t get overly involved with friends? problems.
16. It is difficult for me to experience strongly the feelings of characters in a book of 
movie.
17. It upsets me to see someone being mistreated.
18.1 easily get carried away by the lyrics of love songs.
19.1 am not affected easily by the strong emotions of people around me.
2 0 . 1 have difficulty knowing what babies and children feel.
21. It really hurts me to watch someone who is suffering from a terminal illness.
22. A crying child does not necessarily get my attention.
23. Another’s happiness can be very uplifting for me.
2 4 .1 have difficulty feeling and reacting to the emotional expressions of foreigners.
2 5 .1 get a strong urge to help when I see someone in distress.
26. I am rarely moved to tears while reading a book or watching a movie.
2 7 .1 have little sympathy for people who cause their own serious illnesses (e.g., heart 
disease, diabetes, lung cancer.)
2 8 .1 would not watch an execution.
2 9 .1 get easily excited when those around me are lively and happy.
30. The unhappiness or distress of a stranger are not especially moving for me.
Facial Expression Task 
Answer Sheet used with JACFEE (Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988)
Directions: You will be seeing a series of photographs of people making different facial 
expressions. Your job will be to decide what the person in the photograph is feeling. For 
















PHOTOGRAPH 6 : _____
PHOTOGRAPH 7 :_____
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